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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

EGMA-74651 AH.

Time and Place:

EBRITZ

1100-1230, 11 December 1970

1. [] had arranged this meeting on his last preceding visit to CATRIBE, to introduce Deputy Chief LNBRAN to [] on 2 December. We were surprised, but not displeased, to see @BRITZ present, and he participated actively at several points in the meeting. Since the session ranged over most current joint interests, it contains reference to several sensitive matters which are being reported in separate channels. To preserve the chronological continuity of the meeting, these matters are noted as they arose, without specific identification, in the following account.

GENERAL:

2. [] opened the meeting by stating that he had asked [] for the present session in order to have a general discussion of CATRIBE-JKLANCE relationships after [] had completed his first three months or so [] assumed command of the [] on 13 August 1970) of service as the Chief of Station Germany. [] stated that if [] concurred, [] would plan to hold such a session every three months or so, the location to be at []'s convenience, either in Munich or Bonn. [] added that he was aware of [] crowded schedule, thus it might be easier for him to come to Munich rather than to try for some form of reciprocity with respect to the area of the meetings. [] replied that he heartily endorsed the idea of such periodic meetings, that he was most appreciative that [] had suggested the initial meeting

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and had come to Munich for it. [] said that he also appreciated []'s thoughtfulness in being willing to have a flexible arrangement concerning both timing and location; he would like to hold some of the meetings in Bonn, but it was impossible to fix such encounters in advance. [] added that he hoped [] would take the initiative regarding the timing of the meetings; [] would plan to respond affirmatively concerning any meeting suggested by [], since he considered that close contact between the two groups at the present meeting - he gestured towards @BRITZ and [] - was very useful with respect to the maintenance of fruitful relations between the two services involved.

3. [] then stated that in opening this first of what he hoped would be a series of productive meetings he wished to underline to [] and @BRITZ what he had said at the time of the initial meeting with [] in August 1970: JKLANCE attached great importance to the maintenance of a close cooperative relationship to CATRIBE; JKLANCE had a number of close relationships with various other intelligence services, however the tie to CATRIBE was a unique one, because of the manner in which CATRIBE had come into existence and the role of JKLANCE with respect to both the birth and the development of CATRIBE; the Director JKLANCE personally was very interested in the relationship between CATRIBE and JKLANCE, and, as [] was aware, paid close attention to developments in this liaison. [] added that he considered that overseeing the maintenance of a mutually productive relationship between JKLANCE and CATRIBE constituted one of his main areas of responsibility as Chief of Station, that he took this responsibility very seriously, and, as [] could observe from []'s frequent visits to Munich and CATRIBE, he had devoted a considerable amount of time to those aspects of the liaison with which [] was directly concerned. [] then commented that he had been particularly pleased to see the interest and skill which [] was exercising in his relationships with CATRIBE and that he could assure [] and @BRITZ that the two JKLANCE representatives were working in close harmony concerning matters involving CATRIBE. [] responded

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by saying that he much appreciated []'s comments concerning the JKLANCE-CATRIE relationship; for his part he could assure [] that both @BRITZ and he were keenly aware of the importance of the relationship to CATRIE and that they would work very closely with [] and [] concerning matters of mutual interest.

4. CASCENE Visits: [] then turned to the several CASCENE visits that had taken place since he and [] had arrived, expressing his hope and belief that they had served to further the relationship described previously. We now particularly looked forward to the last in this series--that of @BRITZ and @HEINE next spring, and welcomed @BRITZ's thoughts on a useful program. @BRITZ reiterated that he would be working on this with [] after talking to [], the last visitor who was to return on the weekend. [] noted that he would be writing a Christmas note to [] in which he might suggest that he, [] spend a few days at Headquarters in the fall of 1971. We welcomed this intention.

5. Sensitive Subject (see extract in other channels).

6. Sensitive Subject (see extract in other channels).

7. [] Matters (see extract in other channels).

DER SPIEGEL SERIES ON CATRIE:

8. Note: Prior to the meeting [] and [] had discussed this topic in connection with the planned discussion of UTILITY with []. [] had agreed that the building of a "firebreak" concerning this topic was advisable (on the off-chance that UTILITY already had revealed or might reveal to CATRIE that he had "discussed" the subject with "JKLANCE"), and had agreed re the tactics to be used in broaching the topic.

9. [] opened discussion of this topic by saying that he had a "sensitive" matter to discuss, i.e., the fact that he had learned that Der Spiegel planned to publish a series of articles concerning CATRIE. [] said that he had been "approached indirectly" by a journalist

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who had indicated that Der Spiegel was planning a series concerning CATRIBE and who had attempted to elicit comments from [] concerning the performance of CATRIBE as an intelligence organization and regarding the ties between CATRIBE and JKLANCE. [] said that he had made it quite clear to the intermediary that under no circumstances would he make any comment concerning either CATRIBE itself or any relationship between CATRIBE and any LNLUTE agency. (Note: The story regarding the approach to [] by a journalist is fictional; however, [] did indicate to [] that he had knowledge of the forthcoming Der Spiegel series and did comment concerning the content of the series.) [] added that he had wished [] to know about the approach to [] - he assumed that [] was aware that the series was planned - and had wished to ask [] for his evaluation of the series insofar as the interests of JKLANCE were concerned, i.e., was there anything in the series which might cause difficulties for JKLANCE or which conceivably could generate a problem with respect to the CATRIBE-JKLANCE relationship.

10. [] replied that he was grateful to [] for having mentioned the topic and for the manner in which [] had handled the approach by the journalist. The projected series of articles were known to CATRIBE, in fact Der Spiegel had approached CATRIBE (he and BRITZ decided that the approach was made circa May-June 1970) and had invited CATRIBE to review the draft and to comment upon it. After much discussion and thought [] had decided that he would accept the invitation to review the first draft. This draft indeed had been full of erroneous information and if published would have been significantly damaging to CATRIBE and JKLANCE interests (he did not amplify this statement). A second draft was now in the works, and while [] would not welcome its publication, he judged it to be something CATRIBE had to live with, and that it was not damaging to JKLANCE. He did not know whether or when the article would be published, although he had heard the serial might start in February 1971. In general []'s comments seemed to reveal a certain fatalism about this sort of thing--one

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perhaps engendered by []'s well-reported view that an intelligence agency in the modern age cannot live in a false isolation and contrived secrecy and remain forever out of the public eye. [] did promise to let us know if anything came to his attention which indicated that the series would continue information of concern to JKLANCE security interests.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH UTILITY:

Note: The tactics to be used in bringing up this topic and in discussing it had previously been arranged between [] and [].

11. [] took advantage of the general discussion of contacts, publicity, etc. to move into the question of relations with UTILITY; however, since we had not intimated that UTILITY had contacted JKLANCE concerning the Der Spiegel article, this topic arose as a new and unrelated subject. [] began by commenting that he wished to consult with [] concerning another "delicate" problem, that of contact between JKLANCE and UTILITY. [] went on to note that [] had introduced UTILITY to [] just before [] departed in July 1970, but that to date [] had not met UTILITY. [] added that he wished to make clear to CAUTOPIA that [] regarded [] and his designated representatives as the sole current points of official contact with the CATRIBE service, and that business matters would be discussed only through this channel, unless [] on occasion should indicate that he would like to do otherwise. JKLANCE held UTILITY in high esteem as the former chief of an intelligence service which had worked closely with JKLANCE for many years, and the personnel currently assigned to the Station - notably [] - wished to maintain cordial and courteous relations with UTILITY as a mark of the friendly ties which continued between UTILITY and the JKLANCE service in general. However, no element of JKLANCE - at Headquarters or within the Station - intended to raise intelligence business matters with UTILITY; nor would these elements respond affirmatively to any approach by UTILITY concerning what appeared to be CATRIBE business rather than purely a continuing personal interest in world

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affairs in general. In this respect, [] added, he would like to ask [] whether in fact UTILITY would be speaking on behalf of CATRIBE in general or [] in particular, in the event that UTILITY should raise any matters with JKLANCE.

12. [] responded promptly that at present UTILITY had no responsibility for any CATRIBE business and he would appreciate it if [] and his officers would handle any contact with UTILITY accordingly. [] said that through 1970 CATRIBE would subsidize UTILITY with respect to certain "historical work" on which he was engaged, however UTILITY no longer had any connection with current operations of CATRIBE.

13. [] then--and in a manner which suggested that he relished the chance to parade his credentials before EBRTZ--proceeded to sketch the peculiar circumstances of his relationship to UTILITY. He had of course served since World War II as UTILITY's colleague, and had had the closest professional relationship with him. He was, however, a different sort of man--one with perhaps a broader outlook, foreign experience and experience in international relations--he therefore would put his own stamp, a different one, on CATRIBE. This all made his personal relationship with UTILITY rather difficult. [] intervened with the American term for the situation: "It's hard to follow George Washington." [] replied: "That says it all." He then reiterated that we should therefore not interpret any dealings that UTILITY might have with us as representing him or CATRIBE.

14. [] thanked [] for this clarification, and said that any future contacts we might have (and he anticipated none with [] personally) would be governed accordingly. [] commented that, as the person directly affected, he was still concerned that any such further contact might be misconstrued. He anticipated that UTILITY would on occasion, from the best of motives, ask us to undertake things which we absolutely would have to decline if we judged that they in any way impinged on MHRUSH or CATRIBE interests. We would do this because we simply had to, even at the expense of possibly offending

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UTILITY. We wanted [] to understand this, and requested that, should any rumors or reports of actions on our part not meeting this criterion come to his attention, he come to us to clear the air without the slightest hesitation. [] agreed to do so.

15. Relations with the Bundeskanzleramt: [] commented briefly on this subject, raising it within the context of a question to [] as to whether there had been any further movement with respect to the possible creation of a "Current Intelligence Office" in the Bundeskanzleramt (BKA), and noting that it appeared that the other "information systems," ORAKEL and KIS (Kanzlerinformationssysteme) were continuing to be developed. [] replied that although the questions of "current information and analysis" were very much in the front of the mind of the BKA (read []), no specific steps had been taken to date.

16. Closing Remarks: [] turned to [] and asked his understanding if he or some of his officers turned down invitations to social occasions now and then. He wanted [] to understand that these were always for business, and not personal, reasons and that, in his own case, he simply had to restrict the number of invitations he could accept to avoid a quasi-diplomatic round that would be too much to handle. He stated that he would indeed try to attend the reception on 21 December (the first invitation he has received from [] it might be noted), and that in any case his wife would attend. He hoped he could entertain the Chief, LNCUFF Bonn when he visited Munich and we agreed to keep him alerted to such visits. In closing, he anticipated our intention by saying that sessions such as this were very useful--much more so, for example, than cocktail parties--and that he hoped we would repeat. We suggested doing it at about quarterly intervals.

[] Rm [] J/K [] Rm []

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